An incessant theme threading policy discussion in Trinidad and Tobago (TT), although with an ebb and flow over time, is the diversification of the economy away from oil and gas towards nonoil tradables. This topic is once again in the forefront of policy discussions following the recent oil price decline and subsequent to new administration that took office in September 2015. 1 Facing the new administration is the task of dealing with low oil prices in the context of high public expenditure and continued expectations of direct public provision of jobs and income transfers, either directly or through tax expenditures to consumers and businesses. Whether oil prices remain low or not in the near future, the task is not only macroeconomic stabilisationfiscal adjustment-but to boost economic growth hence employment over the medium term.
Diversification needs to play a critical role in that endeavour. Further, so should the exchange rate for not only easing the required short-term fiscal adjustment but also towards the mediumterm objectives of increasing diversification and real non-oil GDP growth hence employment.
In this policy brief we discuss the potential role that the exchange rate plays in diversification, fiscal adjustment and economic growth. In doing so we use a new estimation of the real effective exchange rate that better captures competitiveness of the country's non-oil exports.
2 A caveat is needed. We concentrate on the role of the exchange rate at the exclusion of other policy measures critical for a successful diversification strategy. These other policy recommendations regarding the objective of diversification all -to a greater or lesser extentderive from the assertion that the problem of insufficient diversification faced by Trinidad and Tobago stems from market not government failures: "…we argue that the standard policy advice -implementing structural reforms, improving institutions and the business environment, creating infrastructure and reducing regulations -though necessary, will not be sufficient, because of fundamental market failure stemming from Dutch disease" (Cherif and Hasanov, 2016, p. 4) . For a comprehensive statement of these policy recommendations see Cherif and Hasnov, 2016, for the Trinidad and Tobago case see Artana, Auguste, Moya, Sookram, and Watson, 2007, and Longmore, Jaupart and Cazorla (2014) and Elías, C., F. Jaramillo, and L. Rojas-Suárez.
2006.
Diversification has been a policy imperative going back to the country's first Five Year Plan and in subsequent ones (see Toney 1995) . From these the following can be discerned:
(i) Oil & gas will run out. 3 At current rates of resource extraction, it is estimated that by 2025-2030 Trinidad and Tobago's gas and oil fields will be fully depleted.
(ii) Generate more employment meanwhile. Energy accounts for 44 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) but it only employed 3.1 percent of the labour force over the last decade.
(iii) Reduce vulnerability to the vagaries of international prices of oil and gas.
(iv) To increase overall economic growth as countries with a high percentage of natural resource -point source-exports grew systematically slower than do those with few resources (see Sachs and Warner 1995) .
Over time, reflecting the current dominant common wisdom of policy of that moment, three phases can be determined (see Hilaire 1995) : The first two phases were dominated by "industrialisation by invitation" (1) import-substitution industrialisation, and (2) resource-based industrialisation, (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) . Following the collapse of international oil prices in 1986 that lasted for almost two decades, and needing balance of payments support, the government of Trinidad and Tobago entered into two successive Standby Arrangements with the International Monetary Fund that led to the third phase of export-led industrialisation (1983-present ).
An interesting parallel at that time but very pertinent to Trinidad and Tobago today is the case of Indonesia. As told by , Indonesia is one of three oil exporters (the others being Malaysia and Mexico) that have successfully diversified their economies. The collapse of oil prices in the eighties led Indonesia to a shift in policies towards export promotion through attracting Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) in export industries, creation of free trade zones, and tax incentives while reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. A similar change in policy thrust as Trinidad and Tobago, but Indonesia also had the largest exchange rate devaluation amongst developing countries. Further, these policies were in the context of declining oil production; it became a net importer by 2003. Successful diversification in oil exporters, like Indonesia, took place as their oil revenues were declining, the same decline currently facing
Trinidad and Tobago whose reserves will run out within a short horizon.
However, diversification away from the energy sector towards non-oil and gas tradable in
Trinidad and Tobago has largely failed. A summary measure of diversification is the HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) to measure diversity in exports in terms of goods or markets. A country with a perfectly diversified export portfolio will have an index close to zero, whereas a country 3 BP Statistical Review 2013 data workbook, Energy Information Administration that exports only one product or to one country will have a value of 1 (least diversified). As can be seen, there is diversification only within the energy sector that has been continuously diversifying since the late seventies both in terms of products ( Figure 1 ) as well as in export markets ( Figure 2 ). Vertical diversification within the energy sector occurred as oil production declined and has been replaced by natural gas. Natural gas and petrochemicals exports are now about 1.6 times the magnitude of oil exports. Growth in production of petrochemicals has mirrored the growth in the production of natural gas. The country has become the world's leading exporter of ammonia and methanol that together with urea make up today the main petrochemical products produced in the country. However, regarding non-oil and nonpetrochemical (denoted as "non-Energy" in Figures 1 and 2) , tradable diversification has remained low and almost constant but since the early 2000s has steadily decreased both in terms of commodities and markets. But why is the economy less diversified than desired, i.e., why have past and current policies failed? It is because the country is suffering the Dutch Disease. This disease occurs when a country has a chronic exchange rate overvaluation caused by the exploitation of oil and gas whose production and export is consistent with a more appreciated exchange rate than the exchange rate that would make internationally competitive non-oil and gas tradable. At the same time, producers for the domestic market face competition from cheap imports. Thus, in the 4 See the Annex for details of non-oil and gas exports and their markets. HHI (non-energy) HHI (energy) presence of the Dutch Disease, even those goods that are produced at the frontier of technology are not economically viable in a competitive market. If a new business enterprise utilising modern technology is established in a country affected by this disease, with all the other competitiveness factors being equal, it will only be economically viable if its productivity is greater than the productivity achieved by business enterprises in rival countries to a higher or equal degree of the appreciation of the exchange rate caused by the Disease. 5 The severity of the crowding out of non-oil tradable depends both on the size of oil revenues and the initial technological gap (see Cherif and Hasnov 2016) . In this case forces were stacked against past success in Trinidad and Tobago's diversification endeavour as the Dutch Disease hit hard given a large oil revenue and a high technological gap.
However, there is no single measure by which we can say absolutely that a country's currency is overvalued or undervalued, but there are ways to make some relative estimates.
One of the simplest is to compare a country's per capita GDP, measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates, with its per capita GDP at an exchange rate that is adjusted for . This index is estimated by the following steps: First, we use nominal exchange rates and purchasing power parity conversion factors (PPP) from the Penn World Tables to calculate a "real" exchange rate (RER). Second, we regress the RER on GDP per capita, which gives an estimate of the relation between real GDP and RER of -0.27 (Rodrick found a value of -0.24). So there is a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect: when incomes rise by 10 percent, the real exchange rate falls by around -2.7 percent. An index of undervaluation is obtained as the difference between the actual real exchange rate and the Balassa-Samuelson-adjusted rate. If the index is greater (smaller) than unity then there is an undervaluation (overvaluation). The overvaluation index is drawn in Figure 3 ; the Trinidad and Tobago dollar has been consistently and substantially overvalued. Typically, however, policy discussions focus on a real effective exchange rate. These indexes are usually built to measure a country's overall international competitiveness compared with that of its trading partners. Real effective exchange rate indexes are constructed using a weighted average of a country's nominal and real bilateral exchange rates against a set of countries. However, there is no universally agreed-upon method for calculating effective exchange rate indexes. Therefore, weighting methodologies, the types of trade included and the frequency with which weights are updated vary significantly across countries, making it less well suited to address current competitiveness issues. The choice of weights boils down to two options: trade weighting where the weights are based on direct export shares, import shares or both; and competition weighting where weights reflect the fact that a country's exports face competition from both domestic producers in the destination country and exports from other countries, referred to as third-market competition. The frequency at which trade weights are updated across countries typically falls into one of three time frames: annually, every 3 years, or approximately every 10 years. The most often real effective exchange rate (REER) used is one published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF's REER uses competition weights, covers manufacturing goods, primary products and services (excluding oil) and services (travel only) and adjusts the weights approximately every ten years.
To address these deficiencies, we use a new Trinidad and Tobago adjusted real effective exchange rate (AREER) index using a methodology based on current international best practices. Country coverage should be broadened to i) better reflect Trinidad and 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
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Tobago's trading patterns; ii) Trade weights assigned to a given country should reflect both direct bilateral trade with a country and the competition Trinidad and Tobago faces from that country in third markets; iii) Trade weights should be updated on a regular basis, preferably annually, to ensure that they reflect Trinidad and Tobago's trade patterns over time. The coverage in the REER is limited and weights are changed too infrequently.
The new index includes a broader set of countries and uses annually updated competition-based weights. These weights are constructed using bilateral trade data from the United Nations (UN) Comtrade database and account for both Trinidad's bilateral trade with another country and the competition Trinidad and Tobago faces from that country on a product-by-product basis in third markets. Trade in energy products is important for Trinidad and Tobago; these products have been excluded for the purposes of calculating the weights. Energy is excluded since prices are determined in global energy markets, and exchange rate movements are not expected to affect a country's relative competitiveness in such primary commodities. Discounting energy products also has the benefit of minimizing swings in trade weights that could occur due to large swings in crude oil prices. The index is based on third-market competition thus can be used to assess how exchange rate movements might affect Trinidad and Tobago's export market shares in key export markets.
The AREER fluctuates much more than the IMF's REER and shows a higher degree of appreciation (see Figure 4) . It better captures competitiveness as despite nominal devaluations from 1988 until 1999, the AREER appreciated up to 1993 and thereafter depreciated, reflecting the pattern of currency changes of competitors in TT's export markets. Both AREER and REER indicate an appreciation since 2000. The pattern of appreciation and depreciation is more consistent with lags, the ups and downs of non-oil export, and market diversification (see Figure   5 and 6). 7 Note that in both these figures, total non-oil exports have been filtered by the criterion that the product has a revealed comparative advantage greater than unity. The revealed comparative advantage of a country is measured by the relative weight of a percentage of total export of each commodity of a country over the percentage of world export in that commodity.
When RCA>1, it means that country has a revealed comparative advantage on given commodity. When RCA<1, it means that country has a revealed comparative disadvantage on given commodity. In both figures it is also shown with the filter that a given commodity export is at a minimum 0.5 percent of exports.
7 A more granular pattern can be discerned by looking at key non-oil and gas exports and their markets. In the Annex is shown for three points in time key export products and markets. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 A real devaluation would also boost economic growth of the non-oil sector. Figure   9 shows the response function of non-oil GDP to a one standard deviation in the real exchange rate. The non-oil GDP shows a greater sensitivity to the adjusted real effective exchange rate than to the typical real effective exchange rate. This evidence is consistent with the previous findings where Rodrick (2008) shows that an undervaluation of a country's currency stimulates economic growth. The main channel through which the positive stimulus occurs is the tradable sector. The non-oil trade balance would also improve from a real devaluation. The simulation in Figure 10 shows the impulse response function of the non-oil merchandise trade balance to a one standard deviation shock in the adjusted real exchange rate. The non-oil trade balance initially worsens (not shown in Figure 10 ) but then improves consistently over the long run. The evidence assembled in this policy brief suggests that the exchange rate could have an important role in fiscal adjustment, economic growth, and diversification. A major change of the exchange rate would reduce the size of the fiscal adjustment in the short term. It would boost diversification of non-energy export products and their markets over the medium term, so it would lead to an improvement in the non-oil trade balance of the balance of payments. It would increase economic growth of the non-oil sector, hence employment.
Presumably, there are perceived short-term downsides. These include (i) an inflationary effect which implies reduced household real income and hence a possible increase in poverty, and (ii), increased cost of imported material used as inputs in production, which compounded by microeconomic level balance sheet effects that arise in the presence of liability dollarisation, also leads to negative impacts of real exchange rate devaluations on firms' performance.
Potential downsides that have apparently resulted in a policy donnybrook. Or just like Vladimir and Estragon, (see Ackerley and Gontarski 2006) , policymakers are waiting for Godot; in this case the recovery of oil and gas prices. Either way, the diversification agenda is subsumed to short-term concerns with the corollary of a lost opportunity as a diversification policy can take a couple of decades or so to show results; the same time horizon when oil and gas run out.
Today, the warning by Ramsaran (1995) , writing about the eighties, may be prescient: 
